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PILOT TECHNIQUES

Total preparedness and full briefing
can avoid risky last-second decisions.
By Nihad Daidzic
ATP/CFII.

Tropical storm over OPF (Opa-Locka, Miami FL). Landing on a contaminated runway may lead
to an impossible situation where an overrun is certain, but no safe go-around is possible either.

and Thomas Peterson
ATP. Boeing 747, 757, 767

A

small corporate jet touches
down 2500 ft from the
threshold of a wet 5500-ft
runway with 15 kts excess airspeed.
On touchdown, the crew manually
extend ground spoilers/lift-dump
and deploy thrust reversers while
smoothly lowering the nose gear.
Subsequently, they increase thrust
to provide for maximum retarding
force. The captain pushes on the
brakes and the antiskid system
works flawlessly, modulating the oil
pressure to deliver the maximum
braking efficiency while preventing
the wheels from locking.
Within moments the crew realize
that something is wrong. The aircraft
is not slowing down as expected.
Only 2000 ft of the runway remain
and they are still rolling at well over
115 kts. The captain asks the FO to
check the lift-dump deployment
and verify the thrust reverser setting.
The captain pushes harder on the
brakes.
Only 1000 ft of runway remain
and the jet has barely slowed to
110
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100 kts. Realizing that they cannot
stop on the remaining runway and
fearing an overrun and aircraft damage, the captain calls frantically for
a go-around. He throttles back and
restows the reverser. Spoilers are
retracted. The jet’s engines roar back
to life as the maximum forward
thrust is reached a few seconds after
being commanded.
Airspeed starts to increase again,
but the aircraft is now only 300 ft
from the runway end and below flying airspeed. In desperation, the
captain pulls back hard on the yoke
and the airplane is forced in the air,
exhausting all the lift reserve the
wing could collect.
Immediately after liftoff the stick
shaker activates. The aircraft barely
climbs to 50 ft agl and is now
stalled with a pitch angle exceeding
20°. It crashes about 1500 ft from
the runway end after being barely
airborne for 6–7 seconds. No one
on board survives the accident.

Real versus hypothetical
The above was an imaginary
event, but this one really happened.

On the morning of Jul 31, 2008,
about an hour after powerful morning summer storms had passed
through southern Minnesota, a corporate Hawker 800A crashed during an attempted landing at OWA
(Owatonna MN).
OWA’s 5500 x 100-ft concrete
Runway 30 has an average downslope of 0.7%. At the time of the
accident winds were reported as
light, but just an hour before gusts
were being recorded up to 65 kts.
Heavy rain was reported too.
Two pilots and 6 passengers lost
their lives in the crash. NTSB is still
investigating, but a likely accident
scenario is crystallizing from eyewitness accounts.
It appears that the pilot touched
down long and fast. Realizing that
he couldn’t stop on a wet runway,
he attempted to go around. The aircraft apparently never left ground
effect and stalled in, crashing about
2500 ft from the northwest end of
the runway.
Judging from aerial photos of the
crash location, it appears that the
Hawker lifted off briefly and then
touched down in a cornfield 1500 ft

Photos by Jack Sykes

When go-around is impossible—
defining the point of no return

A question of judgment
Accident statistics show that executing a go-around after touchdown
can be fatal. For example, 37 out of
the 88 on board were killed in the
attempted go-around of an American Airlines Boeing 727 after a
long touchdown at STT (St Thomas,
US Virgin Islands) in Apr 1976.
The airliner touched down about
3000 ft from the threshold of the
4650-ft runway. After abandoning
the braking effort, the captain
attempted to go around. Then, realizing that it would be impossible to
lift off, the captain changed his
mind again and tried to stop. The
727 exited the runway at high
speed, with many fatalities occurring in the ensuing crash and fire.
Unfortunately, neither aircraft
manufacturers nor airlines provide
any guidance or training on if and
when to go around after touchdown. To the best of our knowledge, no standard operating procedures or flight training procedures
address this important safety issue.
Corporate aviation is especially
vulnerable to such events. Business
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and slightly to the right of the
departure end of Rwy 30. This
hypothesis is supported by the fact
that there were no visible marks or
debris in the field for the first 1500
ft or so. Had the Hawker exited the
runway rolling, it would have
stopped in a much shorter distance
than 2500 ft, since cornfields provide high deceleration.
One problem with runway contamination at small airports is that
the pilot doesn’t know what to
expect until touchdown occurs and
while attempting to slow down.
And by then it might already be too
late. The point-of-no-return for a
successful go-around has been
passed, and the aircraft cannot stop
nor safely take off on the runway
remaining—a sort of ground-equivalent “coffin corner.”
The fact that the jet in the OWA
accident may have touched down
long and with excessive airspeed
could not have helped. It may be
that the captain realized the aircraft
could not stop on the remaining
runway. But was attempting a goaround a prudent thing to do? Is
there such a thing as an unsafe or
impossible go-around?
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aircraft land on all kind of runways,
many of which have no porous friction course (PFC), meaning that
even a moderate rain can cause
standing patches of water and
induce hydroplaning. In addition,
some corporate operators have no
built-in landing safety factor as
required by FARs for commercial
operators—which are not “bulletproof” either.
The fundamental question is
when and where on the runway is
the point-of-no-return for a goaround reached. The aircraft may or
may not be able to stop on the
remaining runway. However, if it is
slowed below the minimum safe
go-around speed, there will not be
enough runway remaining for it to
become safely airborne either.
Therefore, the crew should accept a
runway overrun as a lesser evil.
The point-of-no-return and minimum safe speed to initiate a goaround are functions of the runway
landing distance available (LDA),
actual touchdown point, density
altitude, wind, pilot reaction time
(ie, decision time), inertia and duration of the configuration change. A
full analytical analysis of this problem is complicated and requires
more space. However, we have
derived an approximate analytical
model and employed few assump-

tions to predict the minimum goaround speed with reasonable
accuracy.
Assuming proper tire inflation, a
Hawker 800’s hydroplaning speed is
just below 100 kts. This means that
for groundspeeds in excess of 100
kts the rolling friction deceleration
will be on the order of 1 kt per sec
(1 kt/s) or about 0.05 g. Thrust
reversers typically provide up to
40% of the average forward thrust.
Thus, the maximum possible deceleration while hydroplaning is about
0.20 g (6.45 ft/s2 or roughly 4 kts/s).
Average takeoff acceleration,
neglecting the rolling friction drag
and aerodynamic drag, is 0.33 g
(10.60 ft/s2).
We also assumed identical speeds
for liftoff (takeoff configuration) and
touchdown (landing configuration).
The chart at the top of this page
shows the rolling distance versus
groundspeed for constant acceleration or deceleration. Low deceleration has a detrimental effect on
minimum go-around speed. To calculate a minimum safe go-around
speed (decelerate to and accelerate
from), one needs to subtract the
touchdown (air-distance) and configuration-change/inertia-distance
from the LDA.
The upper table on p 112 summarizes the minimum safe go-around
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Air distance (touchdown)
VLOF (kts)
120
130
140

1500 ft

2500 ft

3500 ft

77.2 kts

93.7 kts

107.6 kts

11.3 s

6.9 s

3.3 s

92.0 kts

106.2 kts

118.7 kts

10.0 s

6.3 s

3.0 s

105.6 kts

118.2 kts

129.6 kts

9.1 s

5.7 s

2.7 s

Calculated go-around (aborted landing roll) groundspeed and maximum safe elapsed time
before go-around is initiated with a 1000-ft “indecision” distance, hydroplaning surface and
maximum thrust reversers deployed (0.20 g or 3.80 kts/s). Go-around speeds and elapsed
times as a function of touchdown/lift-off speeds and actual touchdown (air) distance from the
threshold are shown for a 5500-ft runway.

speed and safe deceleration elapsed
time for a runway length of 5500 ft.
The nose gear touchdown point was
variable—1500, 2500 and 3500 ft.
We assumed that the main gear
would touch down first, followed
by nose gear derotation in the next
3 sec, defining the total air-distance.
Inertia-distance and/or configuration-change-distance can vary dramatically. We assumed 1000 ft for
“normal” pilot reaction (about 5
sec). The fast 500-ft configurationchange-distance does not make
much of a difference. The liftoff
groundspeeds (GS) are 120, 130, or
140 kts. Density altitude, tailwind
and excessive landing speed are
thus indirectly included. The pilot
may use somewhat slower liftoff

speed—the minimum-unstick airspeed Vmu—but this certification
airspeed is normally not published
or available to pilots. The lower
table on this page shows the rejected landing-roll minimum safe goaround speed and the elapsed time
to slow to it, based on a hydroplaning aircraft without thrust reversers.
To illustrate this methodology
using an example, let us assume a
pilot touches down 2500 ft from the
threshold of a 5500-ft runway at a
GS of 130 kts. Deploying thrust
reversers (see upper table) and
using whatever friction braking
might be available on the hydroplaning surface, the pilot has only
about 6 sec (slow down to about
106 kts) to determine whether a go-

Air distance (touchdown)
VLOF (kts)
120
130
140

1500 ft

2500 ft

3500 ft

106.5 kts

111.2 kts

115.7 kts

14.0 s

9.2 s

4.5 s

117.6 kts

121.9 kts

126.0 kts

13.0 s

8.4 s

4.2 s

128.6 kts

132.5 kts

136.3 kts

11.9 s

7.8 s

3.9 s

Calculated go-around (aborted landing roll) groundspeed and maximum safe elapsed time
before go-around is initiated with a 1000-ft “indecision” distance, hydroplaning surface and
no thrust reversers deployed (0.05 g or 0.96 kts/s). Go-around speeds and elapsed times as a
function of touchdown/lift-off speeds and actual touchdown (air) distance from the runway
threshold are shown for a 5500-ft runway.
112

PROFESSIONAL PILOT / December 2008

around is appropriate and take first
action.
If the pilot continues slowing
down, he might stop in the next
3200 ft or so, provided there is no
hydroplaning below 100 kts and
assuming maximum thrust reversers
until full stop. The aircraft will have
exited the runway, but at a low
speed. Obviously, the runway contamination and the pilot performance plays crucial role. It is that
initial deceleration that can completely confuse the pilot.
If the airplane is not equipped
with thrust reversers (see lower
table), trying to stop would theoretically consume an additional 7800
ft. Since the runway remaining is
only 3000 ft, the airplane would
overrun the runway at high speed,
causing certain damage and
injuries. A decision to go around is
prudent, but the pilot has only
about 8 sec from nose-gear touchdown to make that decision and
start taking action.
Interestingly, thrust reversers are a
mixed blessing. While obviously
helping to slow down faster, they
bring a pilot to a worse situation by
giving him/her less time to decide if
a go-around is appropriate.

Impossible choices
We can conclude that, if the thrust
reversers are used, a decision to go
around should be abandoned unless
initiated in the first few seconds after
touchdown. But can such a short
time give pilots enough clues to
what to expect on the runway?
It is not easy to make a radical
change in mindset and go from the
“stop-stop” to the “go-go” decision.
Not only do the inertia of the aircraft and delay time in configuration changes play significant roles—
so does the inertia in the human
decision-making process.
The pilot must make up his/her
mind before touchdown and know
when the point of no return on the
runway is reached. A touchdown
should not be attempted at all if
there is any suspicion of serious
runway contamination and poor
braking. Clearly, being at the proper
airspeed and touching down on a
fixed-distance marker gives the corporate pilot more options.
Pilots continue to discuss and
debate all aspects of the go-around,

Cessna Citation Excel takes off in morning fog at VNY (Van Nuys CA). Having to land in fog and freezing drizzle/rain
conditions can be extremely hazardous. Runway overrun is better than lifting too early for a go-around and stalling it in.

whether in large venues such as
safety meetings or between each
other in the cockpit. Since most
readers will have been in a conversation at one time or another
regarding the go-around decision,
they would likely agree that nearly
everyone says they’d have no problem making the right decision if and
when faced with it. So why do
pilots still make the wrong choice
more often than they should?
Unfortunately, it seems most
pilots almost hate to go around. The
missed approach procedure is
always discussed during the approach briefing, but never the circumstances that would precipitate
a go-around. It becomes almost a
formality.
Pilots fail to execute a go-around
for all kinds of reasons. There’s that
smooth landing everyone tries to
make, regardless of how far past the
landing zone they float. They may
be behind schedule, or the weather
may be stormy, or they’re overconfident in the performance of their aircraft—or pride may make them hesitate to make that go-around.

Failing to establish realistic goaround “markers”—or not exercising the discipline to follow them—
can leave a pilot with the choice
those pilots in this article probably
found themselves having to make—
and it’s an impossible choice. At
that point the only questions
remaining are whether it’s better to
accept a landing overrun, perhaps
with serious consequences, or try
an “impossible” go-around that will
end catastrophically.

Luck versus judgment
Although an “airborne” goaround is often discussed in initial
pilot training, and in just about
every new aircraft training program
thereafter, it is not analyzed thoroughly enough or trained well
enough into new pilots—or, even
more so, into some seasoned pilots.
We suggest that the decision on
rejected landing-roll and go-around
takeoff be made during the approach briefing. In this way, no time
is wasted on the runway should a
touchdown occur and further action

be required. This situation is potentially more dangerous than the V1cut, and surprisingly little attention
has been given to it.
From initial training on, pilots are
taught to make decisions based on
known performance parameters.
The decision-making process in this
case breaks down completely, and
the indecision and hesitation that
result just compound the problem—
as does the fact that you, as a pilot,
may not recognize that your airplane is not performing as well as
you expect. Even after receiving all
available information regarding
braking action, and the data in the
aircraft operating manual, things
may not go as planned.
This in turn can lead to what FAA’s
Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge calls a “poor judgment
chain,” in which one bad decision
often leads to another. As this string
of bad calls grows, it limits the number of follow-on alternatives for continued safe flight. This in turn often
erodes any situational awareness
and the ability to execute sound risk
management. Hopefully, this article
will prompt pilots to revisit their goaround parameters before touchdown and rethink some of those situations where they thought, “Man,
we should have gone around back
there—we were lucky.”
Nihad Daidzic is associate professor of aviation
and chair of the Aviation
Dept at Minnesota State
University, Mankato MN.

Beechjet 400A pilots perform a night approach to IAD (Dulles, Washington DC). Landing on a
contaminated runway at night may be particularly hazardous since judging deceleration visually is far more difficult in darkness. It is important to touch down on the fixed-distance markers
at the correct airspeed.

Thomas Peterson is an
ex-USAF pilot serving
as assistant professor
of aviation in the
same department.
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